ABSTRACT The Chinese Communist Party has maintained tight control over the institutions and processes for creating and deleting official posts. The Party's goal of maintaining as many official positions as possible to preserve political patronage and social stability conflicts with the need to curb administrative expenses and cut government deficits. Aggregate data indicate that the downsizing campaigns of the 1990s have not been particularly successful and that staffing levels in local government are probably to a large extent politically determined. A case study reveals that some local governments may have officially downsized while expanding the total size of public employment.
China's system for controlling the creation and deletion of official posts should have permitted the state to downsize itself during the government re-organization campaigns of the 1990s. Yet because of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) needs for political patronage and social stability, downsizing of core government has not been particularly successful. Managing the retrenchment of China's public non-profit institutions is the responsibility of the State Commission for Public Sector Reform. This Party organization approves re-organization plans for all central government agencies, provincial governments and central-level service units (shiye danwei) that lay down their organization structure (jigou), functions (zhineng) and number of officially approved positions (bianzhi). Downsizing is concerned with the latter issue -determining the number of officially approved positions of an organization and actually carrying out the staff reductions.
Previous research has sometimes confused the bianzhi system with the nomenklatura system. 1 As Brødsgaard points out, they are different. 2 The latter is a system for vetting personnel appointments and dismissals and covers all leadership positions (from section chief up) including reserve candidates for these positions, while the former is a system for creating and deleting posts. 3 The bianzhi refers to all positions that have been officially created. Especially at the most junior levels many positions on the bianzhi are not on the Party's nomenklatura: for example, not all section members are on the reserve list for promotion to section chief. Moreover, the bianzhi system is neither concerned with lists of officials who might fill the positions nor mechanisms for making these appointments. Previous research fails to examine the outcomes of downsizing attempts and sometimes reports changes to bianzhi targets as though they were actually achieved. 4 This article points out the difficulties of trying to determine whether the cuts have been made and, based on data from the 1993 to 1996 downsizing exercise, argues that generally the targeted cuts have not been realized. Given the relatively widespread practice of many poor local governments in China of employing more people than they have positions (chaobian), 5 we need to investigate the principles and mechanisms on which bianzhi targets are established. Previous research has neglected this important area. The article examines a number of possible explanations of core staffing levels of local governments in the 1990s and presents a case study of downsizing in a district government of a northern China city.
Chinese authorities attempted to downsize core government on many occasions, twice in the 1990s. 6 The most recent attempt was carried out from 1998 to 2002 during which authorities announced that they had cut approved administrative positions (xingzheng bianzhi) by 1.15 million posts nation-wide. 7 Authorities also reported that they had cut the number of employees exceeding approved levels (chaobian) at prefectural, county and township levels by 430,000 people. The government reportedly re-organized the State Council into 29 ministry-level agencies down from 40, and abolished some 200 bureaus.
8 Provincial-level agencies were reportedly cut from 55 to 40, prefectural-level agencies from 45 to 35 and county-level agencies from 28 to 18. Authorities reported that central and provincial level party bureaucracies shed 20 per cent of their employees, while the State Council reportedly shed 47.5 per cent. Officially, provincial level government cut 48.2 per cent of employees, and prefectures, counties and townships downsized by 19.4 per cent. 9 We argue that cuts of such magnitude should have had an impact on aggregate levels of employment in core government. That they generally have not is an indication that the claims for substantial downsizing from 1998 to 2002 should be treated with caution.
The CCP has maintained tight control over the process of creating and deleting official government positions to preserve political patronage and 4. See Brødsgaard, "Institutional reform and the bianzhi system in China," pp. 375-76. 5. Ibid. pp. 366-69. 6. Liu Zhifeng, Di qici geming: 1998 Zhongguo zhengfu jigou gaige beiwanglu (The Seventh Revolution: the 1998 Reform of the Chinese Government) (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 1998).
7. Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 20 June, 2002. 8 . Ibid. 9. Ibid. "Downsizing" the Chinese State social stability. First, the Party's position in power depends on being able to offer official employment to as many people as possible. Maintaining control over the number of official positions allows the CCP to manage the scope of political patronage. To maintain its position in power the CCP must be able to reward its friends and supporters. The Party's system of controlling the bianzhi was developed during a time when virtually all urban employment was official or state-sponsored. From the mid-1950s and throughout the 1960s and 1970s the scope of the bianzhi was accordingly very wide. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, with economic reform the scope of the bianzhi has shrunk. Maintaining tight control over the creation and deletion of the remaining official posts has, thus, become a high priority for the Party. Secondly, the Party's position in power depends on maintaining social stability which requires relatively high levels of growth with high rates of employment. Economic restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s has increased unemployment, so that by the late 1990s at least 15.5 million workers were unemployed in China's cities, or about 7.5 per cent of the urban workforce.
10 From 1993 to 1999 the number of people employed by state-owned enterprises fell from 76.4 million to 47.3 million.
11 The potential for the unemployed to oppose the regime cannot be exaggerated.
In spite of the CCP's interest in establishing as many official positions as possible, there are countervailing incentives for downsizing the state. Government revenue as a percentage of GDP has declined in recent years, from 25.7 per cent in 1980 to 10.7 per cent in 1995.
12 It recovered somewhat after that and in 1998-99 stood at 14 per cent of GDP, still relatively low. As revenues have shrunk non-economic public employment has grown. From 1978 to 1996, for example, the number of employees supported by the state (caizheng gongyang renyuan) increased by 82.3 per cent to 36.73 million, an increase of from 2.1 to 3 per cent of the entire population.
13 Administrative expenses also grew from about 5.5 per cent of total government expenditure in 1980 to 13.1 per cent in 1996. The rapid growth of public employment contributed to government deficits that grew from 1988 onwards. From 1990 to 1999 the deficit grew from 14.6 billion yuan to 174.4 billion yuan.
14 Government expenditure grew faster than revenue in 1991, 1994, 1998 and 1999 . This situation has encouraged the government to rein in personnel costs. 19 This change was deemed necessary to extend the reach of bianzhi control (and, thus, downsizing) to non-core government agencies (including the bureaucracies of the Party, people's congresses, the courts, the procuratorate and so forth).
The evolution of the institutional arrangements for control of the bianzhi reveals, first, the importance that the Party places on managing this function. Indeed, by 1991 the CCP had taken direct control of bianzhi work. Secondly, although the exact location of the function has changed from time to time, since 1952 bianzhi work has been closely associated with organization and personnel work, again a Party preoccupation. Thirdly, the frequent changes to the location of bianzhi control appear to have been associated with major downsizing or restructuring campaigns. Through the changes authorities may have sought to signal to government officials that the campaigns should be taken seriously. Thus they provided the bianzhi control apparatus with a higher at least symbolic status that lasted for the duration of the campaign. As shown above, the CCP has a clear interest in maintaining as many official positions as possible, an interest that runs directly counter to the need to downsize. Undoubtedly this conflict has undermined the campaigns.
The SCPSR is usually headed by the Premier (Li Peng from 1991 to 1998 and Zhu Rongji from 1998 to the time of writing), an indication however, and with close ties to the SCPSR.
The SCPSR (and its network of local commissions) is responsible for determining the functions of, internal organization structure of, and number of approved administrative positions (establishment or bianzhi) in all government agencies and service units throughout the country. The Commission's authority also extends to approval of the internal organization structure and establishment of the bureaucracies of the CCP, the democratic parties and mass organizations, and to the bureaucracies of the NPC, CPPCC, Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate. 22 In the 1980s and 1990s the three duties of the SCPSR have been manifested in "three fixes" plans that all government agencies and service units have prepared for SCPSR approval during each round of administrative reform. These plans "fix" organization functions, institutional structure and numbers of approved administrative positions within each agency (ding zhineng, ding jigou, ding bianzhi). SCPSR approval is required for each change of function, then, for a government agency (such as the change to the functions of the People's Bank of China that made it the country's central bank or the decision to set up the China Securities Regulatory Commission, or the decision to corporatize the Ministry of Electric Power). The SCPSR at the centre approves provin-20. Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu yanjiushi (ed.) Dang de zuzhi gongzuo dashiji 1993 -1997 (Diary of Party Organization Work, 1993 -1997 The SCPSR differs considerably from administrative reform agencies overseas. First, reflecting the one-party nature of China's political system, the State Commission is a creature of the CCP. The scope of its authority is nominally very broad, for it includes not only the executive but the legislature, the judiciary, the CCP itself and the eight official democratic parties, mass organizations (such as the All China Federation of Trade Unions) and service units, such as schools, hospitals and research institutes. Most administrative reform agencies overseas are established by governments to manage reform that is much narrower in scope.
The 24 In 1991, the SCPSR was moved from the State Council to the Party Central Committee and its authority strengthened. Although Li Peng continued to head the body, the position of Deputy Head was upgraded by the appointment of Politburo member Song Ping. The two previous Deputy Heads became ordinary members of the Commission. To the other ordinary members were added senior positions in the legislature, judiciary and the procuratorate. 25 Finally, in 1993, as the authorities were gearing up for the 1993 administrative reforms, the body was upgraded again. The number of ordinary Commission members was cut from 13 to four and the vice-ministers were replaced by more senior officials. The numbers were probably cut to reduce the opportunities for government bureaus to plead for special treatment. A smaller, more powerful and more cohesive Commission should have been more effective.
A second characteristic of China's administrative reform agency that sets it apart from similar agencies overseas is the relatively weak position played by the Ministry of Finance, even in the strengthened post-1993 line-up. In many countries, establishment matters, including the cost and size of the civil service, are tightly controlled by Treasury officials. In China, by contrast, control of establishment is vested in the CCP. The Ministry of Finance plays a weak role, as it has done in other arenas as well. The day-to-day work of the SCPSR is carried out by a General Office (GO), usually headed by the Minister of Personnel (the current incumbent is a Zhang Zhijian, who holds ministerial rank (zhengbuji)). The number of employees of the GO grew rapidly from about 50 people in 1991 to over 100 in 1997. In the 1998 restructuring, however, the level of staffing was cut by about 30 per cent. 28 In 1996, 73.4 per cent of the GO's staff had graduated from university. Of these, 20.3 per cent had master's degrees. Men outnumbered women by about 2.6 to 1. Nearly half the employees were between 35 and 50 years old, while another 17 per cent were over 50.
Similar organizations have been established at provincial, prefectural and county levels. Generally, the provincial Commissions are joint party-state organizations, usually headed by the provincial governor. In the case of Anhui province, for example, the Commission consisted of the provincial governor, two vice-governors and two senior Party officials, one of whom headed the Party Organization Department. In the 1993 reforms they formed the standing committee of an "organization reform leading small group" set up in the province to supervise the drafting of the province's administrative reform plan, submit it to the SCPSR for approval and supervise its implementation. 29 Additional members of the commission included the heads of the provincial bureaus of personnel and finance, and the deputy head of the provincial economic system reform commission. The head of the personnel bureau also headed the General Office of the provincial Commission. In 1996 the GO employed 15 people, organized in two divisions, one each to handle administrative agencies (such as government and Party organs) and service units. A network of commissions links China's counties, cities and provinces to the SCPSR in Beijing. They all come under the administrative guidance of the SCPSR. 
SCPSR, Zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui bangongshi (General

Administrative Bianzhi Plans
The drafting of organizational reform plans in China is a top-down exercise. The SCPSR drafts guidelines for organizational reform that are discussed and approved by the Politburo and the State Council. Draft plans for specific central-level agencies are produced by the agencies themselves under the guidelines and in consultation with the SCPSR, which must approve them. A strategic plan incorporating all the specific proposals is then discussed by the Politburo and the State Council, approved by the Central Committee, and finally approved by the National People's Congress.
Central policy for determining the structure of local government has changed in recent years. Up until 1998, the SCPSR required provincial and local governments to establish a specific number of agencies set out on a list 30 (see Table 2 ). Generally, provinces and first and second tier cities (see below) were required to establish the most complete administrative machinery. Prefectures, counties and towns/townships were required to establish relatively fewer government offices. Tax offices, for example, were only required at provincial level. According to bianzhi regulations, each administrative level was required to establish a general office, planning office, and offices to manage education, public security, civil affairs, finance, agriculture, health, family planning, audit, statistics, and industry and commerce. Local Party and government organs were instructed to study the lists and carry out the instructions. Apart from the mandatory agencies laid down by the SCPSR, each jurisdiction had discretion about which other agencies to establish within the overall establishment targets. The establishment of additional agencies formed much of the basis of each jurisdiction's "three fixes" plan and that was approved by higher level commissions and ultimately by the SCPSR in Beijing.
Authorities apparently relaxed these requirements in 1998 when the government abolished "mandatory department lists." According to an authoritative source, "… central authorities no longer demand that a local government establish specific departments to match those at a higher level." 31 The revised policy urged local governments to be innovative as they downsize and not to be seduced by departments at higher levels, which undoubtedly prefer for administrative convenience and bureaucratic accountability to have their own departments duplicated at each level. Local governments may also prefer these arrangements, however, to facilitate communications and the transfer of (human and financial) resources. Because following higher administrative levels on organizational matters is so entrenched, the new policy may have had little impact.
30. "Zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui guanyu difang geji dangzheng jigou shezhi de yijian" ("Opinion of the SCPSR on establishing local Party and government organs"), Zhongbian, No. 4 (1993), in China Local Government Organizational Reform, pp. 72-74 . Central government officials apparently tried to do away with the list for some time.
31. Wang Zhenning, "Localities given decision-making power in administrative structural reform," Ta Kung Pau, 19 June 1999 , in FBIS-CHI-1999 "Zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui guanyu difang geji dangzheng jigou shezhi de yijian" ("Opinion of the SCPSR on establishing local Party and government organs"), Zhongbian, No. 4 (1993) It was specifically aimed at poorer areas that did not have the financial capacity to support large governments. "In the case of poor and remote border areas, the departmental line-up should be even simpler. In those areas, departments should be as comprehensive as possible." 32 Still, provincial level governments were urged to set up departments that "roughly correspond to the structure of the State Council."
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To help it determine the appropriate number of administrative posts for each jurisdiction, the SCPSR has classified cities and counties into first, second and third-tier jurisdictions based on a number of criteria, including total population, total non-agricultural population, land area, urban land area, number of administrative districts, the local budget income and the total value of output. The SCPSR uses the criteria to evaluate the appropriate size of each jurisdiction's administrative bianzhi. The Commission uses a similar method, based on fewer criteria (total population, land area, total value of industrial and agricultural output, and the county budget income) to classify counties, also into several tiers. Towns and townships are classified based on population, land area, and total value of agricultural and industrial production.
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The authorities then advise each municipality on the number of Party and government agencies it should establish. In 1993, first-tier cities, which were more populous and richer, were permitted to establish about 60 agencies; second-tier cities about 50 agencies; and third-tier cities, which were less populous and less developed, about 40 agencies. Public Sector Reform Commissions instructed each first and second-tier city to establish a minimum of 22 specific agencies (see Table 2 ). Third-tier cities were instructed to set up a minimum of 15 specific agencies. By 1998 the target number of agencies had been further reduced. Provincial governments would retain from 30 to 40 agencies depending on their level of development, with poorer areas establishing fewer departments/ bureaus. Beijing, Tianjian, Shanghai and Chongqing would retain about 46 bureaus. In first, second and third-tier cities, further cuts were also mandated -and their target number of bureaus became 40, 30 and 20 respectively. Towns and townships, depending on size, were to establish 22, 18 and 14 departments as well. According to the government, when implemented these cuts would enable local governments to cut their payrolls in half.
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Central and Local Administrative Bianzhi Targets
Based on these principles and quotas, the SCPSR lays down administrative bianzhi targets for central and local governments (these exclude 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. "Guanyu yinfa shi, xian ji xiangzhen fenwei biaozhun de tongzhi" ("Notice on the printing and distribution of city, county, town, and township classification criteria"), Zhongbianban, No. 17 (1993), in China Local Government Organizational Reform, p. 75. 35. Wang Zhenning, "Localities given decision-making power in administrative structural reform." "Downsizing" the Chinese State bianzhi targets for service units (shiye danwei). The targets laid down in 1990, 1993 and 1998 for selected central government agencies appear in Table 3 . They reveal, first, that from 1990 to 1998 there was a continuous decline in the establishment of most central agencies. That is, by 1993 establishment had not crept back to 1990 levels, a problem that characterized most pre-1990 attempts to downsize.
36 Indeed, the decline has been remarkable with many agencies experiencing cuts of 50 per cent in 1998 over 1990 levels. The cuts have been the largest in those economic ministries that became bureaus in 1998 (reaching 80 to 90 per cent). The downsized bureaus were subsequently wound up and their functions folded into the State Commission for Economics and Trade. 37 Authorities spared from savage downsizing some of the regulatory and supervisory agencies, such as the State Administration of Audit. Still, cuts of from 21 to 55 per cent were registered for environmental protection, taxation and statistics.
Interviews with officials in Beijing whose agencies were downsized reveal that in some cases departments believed the cuts were too severe. According to one official, many experienced division-level bureaucrats were sacked in his ministry, which undermined the ability of the ministry to function. New officials had to be trained to take over their duties, a process that took time and resulted in substantial delays and near paralysis in the summer of 2000. In another case, officials were asked to vote on which of their colleagues should be required to leave to achieve the targets. This resulted in the least competent (or popular?) colleagues leaving the organization.
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The 1993 administrative bianzhi targets for China's provinces appear in Table 4 . In the 1993 reforms, huge reductions in administrative positions were planned for some provinces. For example, Shanxi, Shaanxi and Shandong provinces were each supposed to reduce their overall administrative establishment by over 40 per cent. Shanghai, on the other hand, was set a target of only a 5 per cent reduction. A perusal of the summaries of the "three fixes" plans for the provinces slated for the largest reductions indicates that authorities hoped to achieve the targets through such measures as abolishing whole levels of government (such as prefectures). That was clearly the plan in Shandong province. 39 In other cases, however, how such large reductions were to be achieved is unclear from the plans.
Administrative bianzhi targets for the 1998 local reforms have yet to be published. 40 38. Interviews, Beijing, July 2000. These problems were apparently quite widespread, indicating the seriousness of the cuts in 1999 and 2000 at the centre.
39. "Shandong sheng zhengfu jigou gaige" ("Shandong provincial government organization reform, 1993"), in China Local Government Organizational Reform, p. 352.
40. Brødsgaard attempts to deduce the administrative and service unit bianzhi for provinces for 1998 from the China Statistical Yearbook, but the figures are undoubtedly incomplete. He excludes many categories of economic activity that would include service units. See Table 3 in Brødsgaard, "Institutional reform and the bianzhi system in China," p. 367. Agencies, 1990 Agencies, , 1993 Agencies, , 1998 Agencies, 1990 Agencies, 1993 Agencies, % change 1998 Agencies, % change % 1990 Agencies, -1998 State Council General Office to cut the number of its departments from 56 to 43 and to cut administrative positions by 50 per cent. 42 Beijing also plans to cut the number of its departments to 45 and the number of its municipal-level administrative positions by 50 per cent. 43 These targets appear to be in line with the approved policies. Whether they started in 1998 with the reduced number of administrative positions that should have been achieved in 1993 (see Table 4 ) is still not clear.
Although the SCPSR uses a specified set of criteria to determine the administrative bianzhi of each jurisdiction, the relative weight given to each indicator is unclear. Further, it seems likely that other criteria, such as the strategic importance of the province, may also have been used. Thus, in 1993 autonomous regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Qinghai appeared to have unusually high numbers of approved administrative positions compared to the total population (see Table 5 ). Authorities may have authorized more administrative positions in these regions for security reasons because of their relatively large national minority populations. Beijing and Tianjin also have relatively large administrative establishments, much larger than Shanghai's, for example. Why Tianjin's establishment should be larger than Shanghai's is unclear. That political status is a consideration is explicitly mentioned in SCPSR Document No. 1 (1994), which granted deputy provincial rank to 16 cities including Guangzhou and Shenzhen. Unfortunately, published statistics do not lend themselves to answering these questions. They do not distinguish core-government employees from non-core government employees. Rather, there are figures for the number of "staff and workers" of an imprecisely defined category, guojia jiguan (state or government agencies). For our purposes we take guojia jiguan as a proxy for core-government.
If the personnel cuts have actually been carried out, we would expect to see some decline in the number of employees of guojia jiguan. Yet from 1993 to 2000 the number of "staff and workers" in these organizations has actually increased from 8.79 million to 10.2 million (see Table  6 ). Employment of "staff and workers" by Party agencies (dangzheng jiguan) (including the CCP) remained relatively stable, while the 42. Xingzheng yu renshi (Administration and Personnel), May 2000, p. 5. 43. Zhongguo jigou, March 2000, p. 9. 44. Other cities include Wuhan, Harbin, Shenyang, Chengdu, Nanjging, Xi'an, Changchun, Jinan, Hangzhou, Chungqing, Dalian, Qingdao and Xiamen. The document indicates that the SCPSR has the authority to make this determination, which is then approved by the Party centre and the State Council. See "Zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui guanyu guangzhou deng shiliu shi xingzheng jibie wenti de tongzhi" ("SCPSR notice on the problem of the administrative rank of Guangzhou and 16 other cities"), Zhongbian, No. 1 (1994) , in China Local Government Organizational Reform, p. 85. number of employees of "social organizations" (shehui tuanti), such as trade unions and the women's federation has declined dramatically, plunging from about 1.5 million to 167,000 during the period. Only from 1993 to 1994 did the total number employed by all three types of official organizations decline, going from 10.3 million to 10.17 million. The data seem to indicate, then, that in aggregate terms during two rounds of "Downsizing" the Chinese State downsizing the number of people employed by core government has actually increased. The data are also consistent with the Ministry of Finance's data on the number of publicly supported employees, which from 1993 to 1998 increased from 29.2 million to 37.9 million. 45 In 1994 and 1995 the government published data on the number of employees of some central government agencies (see Table 7 ). These data indicate that during this period when the central government was carrying out overall downsizing, employment in some departments actually grew. In some cases, this can be explained by the changing functions of the agencies. As one would expect given the new emphasis on taxation as a revenue source, the number of tax collectors grew, from 488,845 to 565,557. Other agencies also saw substantial increases, including the State Economic and Trade Commission (100.7 per cent), the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System (20.4 per cent), the Ministry of Labour (17 per cent), and the Family Planning Commission (12.9 per cent). Employment in some central government agencies was cut, however. The largest cuts were made in water conservancy (20.1 per cent), statistics (11.8 per cent), coal (3.8 per cent) and education (3.6 per cent). 46 The changes may have had less to do with downsizing than with changing the functions of government, on the one hand, and changing reporting criteria, on the other (see below). Data for other years for central government agencies are unavailable.
Aggregate data for official employment in local core governments indicate that from 1990 to 2000 cuts were made in only eight provinces (Beijing, Tianjin, Jilin, Shanghai, Guangdong, Yunnan, Qinghai and Xinjiang) in spite of vigorous downsizing campaigns (see Table 8 ). For the rest, aggregate core government employment remained relatively steady or increased somewhat during the period. What accounts for the changes in local government staffing levels?
According to the SCPSR, bianzhi levels should be set according to total population, land area, number of administrative units and a measure of economic activity (see above). To these may added level of urbanization (measured by population density). We have calculated the correlations of these variables with the number of "staff and workers" of government, Party and social organizations per capita by province from 1990 to 2000 in Table 8 . The results are reported in Table 9 . The strongest correlations are for land area and urbanization in China's poor provinces which are inversely related to the size of core government. That is, the largest poor provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang employed more core government officials per capita, perhaps for public security (politi- (China Labour Statistical Yearbook) 1995 and 1996 (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996 and 1997 cal) reasons. Urban centres in poor provinces also employed more government employees, perhaps reflecting government's role in these areas as an employer of last resort.
We also found that population size and number of administrative units were inversely related to the number of local core government employees. That is, more populous provinces and provinces with more administrative units have fewer core government employees per capita than do less populous provinces and those with fewer administrative units. The central government's campaigns during the 1990s to limit the number of local government employees in spite of population pressure may, therefore, have had some effect. This result coupled with the finding that (except for the early 1990s) the level of economic development (measured by GDP per capita) is unrelated to the size of core government indicates that considerations other than those identified by the SCPSR play a key role in actual core government staffing levels. This conclusion is consistent with an explanation that political factors play a role in local core government staffing levels.
Case Study: Downsizing of a District Government of City "A"
The case of a district government of a city in northern China (City "A") indicates the complexity of the process. While there is some evidence that during the 1993 to 1996 campaign the district government shed employees, examples from some bureaus of the district government indicate that they were able to resist downsizing or that they may have downsized by shifting workers from one category of publicly-funded employment to another, resulting in no net loss of jobs. We examine each of these cases in turn.
According to the district re-organization plan, at the end of 1993 the district employed 4,997 people in Party, government and mass organizations at all administrative levels (district, street office, and town and township). 47 Of these, 2,205 were employed by Party, government, and mass organizations at district level. According to central directives, municipal, district and street offices were to shed 15.5 per cent of their personnel in administrative positions in the reforms. The district's plan called for a reduction of 20.5 per cent for the district as a whole, most of which would be accomplished by making cuts at the town and township levels. Downsizing was also to be accomplished by transferring 589 blue-collar workers to service unit positions, a move that would take them off the administrative bianzhi and put them in the service unit bianzhi. The plans called for a one per cent cut at district/street level (from 3,582 to 3,549) and cuts of 48.6 per cent at town and township level (from 826 to 425). The plan indicates that downsizing should have been completed by the end of May 1995.
Data from 1991 to 2000 for the district government indicate that the number of civil servants (those holding administrative bianzhi positions) employed by the district fell gradually from 1992 and flattened out in 1993 and 1994. Major cuts were made from 1994 to 1996 in line with the plans outlined above (see Figure 1) . That is, there is evidence that the cuts associated with the 1993 to 1996 campaign were made to core govern-"Downsizing" the Chinese State ment positions in this district. Beginning in 1996, however, the district appeared to have added employees. According to district officials the increase was more apparent than real. The sharp increase in employees in 1997 and 1998 was the result of reclassifying the employees of urban management supervisory teams (chengshi guanli jiancha dadui) on the instructions of the municipal government, an instruction that was later rescinded. Thus, from 1991 to 2000 the long-term secular trend was downward. Moreover, the cuts were made at a time when authorities also had to find jobs for about 200 demobilized soldiers per year in 1999 and 2000.
Further investigation of individual bureaus in the district government reveals that some bureaus were able to resist downsizing altogether. According to the district's re-organization plan for 1993 to 1996, Bureau 1 should have a bianzhi of 38, 34 of which were administrative positions (civil servants) and the remaining four service unit positions. In fact, from 1992 to 1996 throughout the period of the downsizing campaign the actual number employed by Bureau 1 did not exceed 34 (see Figure 2) . Still, from 1991 to 2000 the long-term secular trend in this bureau was basically stable -no downsizing is evident. As we have seen, some core-government agencies were strengthened in the reforms, which could explain the case of Bureau 1.
According to the 1993 to 1996 re-organization plan Bureau 2 of the district government was supposed to have a total bianzhi of 39 positions (34 administrative and five service unit, probably for blue-collar workers). In addition, the plan authorized the bureau to set up one service unit employing 20 people. In fact, from 1990 to 1994, the number of "Downsizing" the Chinese State employees holding administrative posts in the bureau remained in the range of 34 to 37 (see Figure 3) . From 1995 to 1996, however, reflecting the impact of the downsizing campaign, the number of employees was cut from 37 to 30, a decline of about 19 per cent, in line with the official target. The bureau continued to employ 30 administrative staff (except in the year 2000) throughout the rest of the period. While the number of administrative employees was cut to conform to the downsizing campaign, authorities increased the number of employees of publicly funded service units beginning in 1996. Indeed from 1996 to 2000 they steadily increased from 17 to 29, an increase of 70.6 per cent. Thus, for the bureau as a whole over the ten-year period the total number of publicly-funded employees actually increased. This case illustrates how authorities can claim downsizing successes (for the administrative bianzhi) in spite of overall increases in publicly funded employment.
The case of a district government in City "A" indicates the complexity of the question of determining the extent to which downsizing has actually occurred. Although the district government as a whole successfully cut the number of its core government administrative employees, these employees may not actually have left the public payroll. The case helps to explain the aggregate data, discussed above, in which the number of employees of guojia jiguan steadily increased during the 1990s in spite of two vigorous downsizing campaigns. That is, although officials left their administrative bianzhi positions they may have been transferred to service unit positions in the same core government agencies. Data from the central government and local level present a more mixed picture. Our case study is representative of the complexity found on the ground. In particular, the case study indicates the important role that the CCP now places on service units to provide official employment.
Conclusion
The Chinese government's admonition that "the bianzhi is the law" has turned out to be true. Just as the law is widely flouted so too are bianzhi ceilings, especially it would seem by local governments in poorer areas where government operates as an employer of last resort. The CCP continues to maintain control over the bianzhi system because of its importance for Party patronage and social stability. Fundamentally conflicted, the CCP needs both to maintain as many official positions as possible and to cut positions for the sake of the economy. Aggregate data indicate that downsizing campaigns have not been particularly successful. Given the Party's mixed motives these results should not be surprising.
